Runway Incursions in the USA
The FAA definition is explicit in regard to intent. Hence, an RI would include an incident involving an aircraft taxi-ing from its stand to the runway, but not, apparently, an aircraft taxi-ing to a stand after landing, although that aircraft could represent a hazard to another aircraft. The FAA goes further than its definition, however, by placing those RIs it records into five categories. The most important are those which require action by the FAA and are listed in Table 1 .
The steady growth in recorded RIs in the USA since 1988 can be seen from the graph in Figure 1 .
In Figure 2 are shown the RIs in the USA recorded by FAA category for the years 1994 -2001.
The main cause of RIs is obviously Category 2 viz. Pilot Deviation: more than half. As a consequence of such statistics, an audit, carried out by the Office of the Inspector-General, of the use of management and technological techniques by the US Department of Transport, concluded that the DoT's failure to deploy RI-prevention systems was
Category Definition
1 Operational error (in which an air traffic controller gives an inappropriate instruc tion to an aircraft or a vehicle) 2 Pilot deviation (in which a pilot, without ATC approval, moves an aircraft into a situation likely to cause a collision) 3 Vehicle/Pedestrian deviation (in which a vehicle or pedestrian enters a runway without ATC approval) why the number of RIs continues to grow each year. As a result of the audit, the FAA established in 1999 a Runway Safety Program with two elements: a) Heightened awareness in aviation personnel (via antirunway-incursion campaigns, meetings, and dissemination of RI prevention information); b) Installation of RI-prevention systems at most of the principal US airports. To date, the deployment of technological equipment consists of the installation of an AMASS at San Francisco International airport and also at Detroit Metro, with others at 32 airports already equipped with the ASDE-3 system. (AMASS and ASDE-3 are described later in the section on Technological Methods.) These systems should have been operational in November 2002.
Despite the strictures of the Inspector-General, US aviation authorities remain convinced that the major cause of RIs is poor comprehension of ATC language by foreign flight crews. In 1944 ICAO established rules which mandated English as the official language of aviation, but the perceived lack of proficiency in, and comprehension of, English by flight crews whose first language is not English continues to be a concern. Some RI accidents are known to have been the direct result of miscommunication between flight crews and ATC controllers. As recently as 1999, at JFK International airport at New York, an Icelandair Boeing 747 with 185 passengers aboard and an Air France Boeing 757 cargo jet nearly collided. After the Air France flight landed it started to taxi to its stand, but during that period the captain was instructed over the RT to hold short of a runway parallel with that from which the Icelandair 747 was about to take-off.
According to the FAA, the Air France aircraft failed to follow the instruction and crossed the parallel runway just as the Icelandair airliner was taking-off: it passed above the Air France aircraft by just 100ft and 50ft to its side. The cause of the error is disputed but Air France blames the use of irregular ATC phraseology by the American ATC. Clarke (2002) presents details of 31 cases of RI at controlled airports in the USA. The details of each case were extracted from NASA's extensive files in its Aviation Safety Reporting System. Incursion Rates are defined as the ratio of recorded RIs to total airport operations. For the FAA controlled airports covered by the data shown in Figure 1 , the annual total airport operations grew from 62,501,059 in 1988 to 67,480,097 in 2000, with small variations in the annual figures. Consequently, the RI rate grew from 300x10 -8 to 640x10 -8 in the same period. The RI rates are shown in Figure 1 (and subsequent figures) as 300, 640 etc. These values should, of course, be multiplied by 10 -8 . The total air transport operations in the USA from 1989-1994 were 377,971,208; because there were in the same period 1351 RIs, the RI rate was 360x10 -8 . Over the same period in the UK there were 3,348,000 operations with 30 RIs ; the corresponding RI rate was 890x10 -8 .
It is plain from Figure 1 that, even in the USA, the actual number of RIs is never very great. However, the reason for the NTSB's concern with RIs as an aviation safety issue lies in the obvious potential such incidents have for resulting in catastrophic accidents.
RI in the Rest of the World
RI incidents do not occur only in the USA, however. The worst accident in aviation history, and the best known, was the runway collision between a PANAM 747-100 and a KLM 747-200 at Tenerife in 1977 which resulted in 583 fatalities. The most recent European runway collision was that at Milan Linate airport, involving an SAS MD87 and a Cessna Citation. In that collision, 110 people died in the airliner, 4 in the business jet, and 4 baggage-handlers on the ground were also killed. The ATC at Milan had already put into operation on that day low visibility procedures: nothing more could have been done by the ATC except close the airport. A mistake was made during taxi-ing by the Citation pilots, who did not declare their intended action to the ATC, possibly because they were unaware that it was erroneous.
The collision in 2001 between a departing Singapore Airlines' 747-100 and some construction equipment, left on a closed runway at Chiang Kai-Shek International airport at Taipei in Taiwan, resulted in the loss of 83 lives.
Although the attitude of the CAA seems to suggest that RIs are not a major problem in the UK, it is worthwhile to tease out what information does exist in official data and statistics to determine, if possible, the rate of RIs (if any). From the CAP 701 Aviation Safety Review, which is an annual publication of the CAA, any AirProx in the UK could fall within the definition of RI proposed by the FAA. Although it cannot be concluded that every recorded AirProx incident is of an RI nature, when taken together with the statistics published in relation to collisions on aerodromes (although these collision figures include both commercial and non-commercial cases), the results suggest, at least, that the phenomenon of RIs does exist in the UK. See Figure 3 .
The data presented in Figure 4 are worth examining, for they should put RI figures into perspective. The fact that over the last ten years almost as many accidents have hap- pened to people not directly involved in aviation (e.g. people being injured by debris, such as ice, falling from aircraft) as there have been incidents involving a collision between aircraft at airports supports the conclusion that a runway incursion is a rare event. A somewhat better source of information about RIs in the UK is the set of statistics for London Heathrow and London Gatwick airports provided by the Department of Transport, the Environment and the Regions. Figure 5 presents that information, augmented with some supplementary data provided from an answer to a parliamentary question. (Hansard[1995] ).
Although it cannot be assumed that the rate of RIs would be the same at other UK airports, it is evident that in the period 1989-1994 the incursion rate was as bad in the UK as in the USA. See Figure 6 .
Such a conclusion would not be supported by the CAA, however. The CAA takes the view that the situation is worse in the USA because the radio telephony phraseology adopted in that country (which does not correspond with the ICAO standard) is the significant cause of RIs in that country. Most UK airports, of course, do not compare in terms of aircraft movements with many of the large FAA-controlled airports in the USA. In the UK only London Heathrow, London Gatwick, and Manchester International are comparable.
To help reduce any confusion which may arise as a result of any misinterpretation of the English language during a busy exchange of information by RT, the UK has already introduced (Anon[2001]) at London Gatwick airport a digital Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) which delivers digital information, such as runway status and weather information, including cloud base, temperature, dew point and surface wind direction and velocity, directly to the Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting Syatem (ACARS).
In this way, accurate and timely information is delivered to the flight deck, providing pilots with access to a printout with continuous updates.
This development can reasonably be regarded as a Controller Pilot Data Link System like that which the FAA introduced in 2002 at Miami airport.
One further source of information about UK RIs is the British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS). A summary of the incidents recorded in BASIS since 1998 (for BA Citiexpress) is presented in Table 2 from which it can be immediately seen that pilot deviation (Category 2) again was the chief cause of most of the incidents. Of the 25 recorded RIs only one occurred in low visibility. Although Manchester is the busiest airport in terms of Citiexpress's operations, it is not the site at which most RIs happened.
Only a single instance was recorded at Southampton airport, which may be a consequence of its simple layout: it has a single runway and one taxi-way, with just two holding-points. Such simplicity might have proved to be helpful to aircrews in interpreting taxi-ing instructions, and in identifying the aircraft's position and the positions of other aircraft, unlike the situation which can obtain at London Heathrow airport, for example. The pilot-induced RIs recorded at Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris may have been caused by language confusion.
Technological Methods of Preventing RIs

Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3)
This is a radar system which assists air traffic controllers to manage the movement of aircraft and vehicles over the airport's surface, particularly during low visibility conditions. The ATC controller is unable, however, to distinguish different aircraft types from the display. The ASDE-3 does not have any traffic conflict prediction or alerting logic. It is installed, at present, at 32 airports in the USA, and at London Heathrow.
Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS)
This computer-based system combines signals from ground and airspace radars with the output signals from special prediction software which has as its inputs the positions of aircraft and any vehicles on the airport surface and their velocities and accelerations. This software forecasts potential collisions, thereby providing the controller with advanced warning. The radar signals are obtained from the ASDE-3 and the airport surveillance radar, the ASR-9. Unfortunately, the performance of AMASS has been less good than was hoped for. The software, for example, has to be tailored to each airport to avoid false alerts generated by radar returns from airport buildings and other fixed structures. As a result, the use of AMASS has been confined to providing air traffic controllers with collision avoidance advice. Moreover, AMASS has been unable to distinguish between a fast-moving vehicle on a runway and a departing aircraft. In addition to these technical limitations, it has proved to be expensive and difficult to install on time. As a result of these shortcomings, the AMASS project has now been scaled back to deal only with active runways, and not the entire airport surface. The ASDE-3 tracks all vehicles, but the prediction software only handles active runways and intersecting taxi-ways.
ASDE-X
This system is to be installed in 25 mid-sized airports in the USA. It differs from the ASDE-3 by using a combination of data from two elements: 1. A conventional, rapid scan, 360° rotation, airport surface detection radar, using the X-band; 2. The Airport Target Identification System (ATIDS), a multilateration system which places for each transponderequipped aircraft an individual identification tag against each individual target on the radar display.
Multilateration Systems
Sometimes referred to as multi-static dependent surveillance systems, multilateration systems consist of a group of transmitters and receivers fixed in position around an airport to provide unobstructed coverage of the airport surface and surrounding airspace. (Reynish[2001] ). These transmitters and receivers send and receive information from aircraft transponders and also from suitably-equipped vehicles. Because it uses the Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) of the various signals to calculate the location of aircraft and vehicles, multilateration is more accurate than radar. With an update rate five times faster than secondary radar the position information is better and, when combined with the ASDE-3 or ASDE-X signals on the ATC display, an aircraft position can be measured to within 3.0 -6.0m.
Automated Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
This generic name is used, particularly in the EC, to denote an integrated system based upon a concept promoted by ICAO. (ICAO[1997] ). The system is intended to provide all the features and functions needed for safe and efficient operations on an airport surface. A number of European airports, especially Schipol at Amsterdam, are developing such systems in collaboration with the American technology companies, Honeywell and Rockwell Collins.
Inductive Loop Technology
Essentially based upon technology used in road traffic management, the system involves inductive loops imbedded in the runway and taxiway surfaces, allowing aircraft or vehicles which pass over the loops to be tracked. In terms of technical complexity, the system is a simple one, but its introduction into any airport is likely to be difficult, and certainly expensive, since it requires considerable disruption to the paved surfaces for an extended period.
Controller Pilot Data Link System
CPLDC is expected to reduce radio transmissions between ATC and aircraft: in future, messages will be exchanged via a data link which will permit text messages to be sent to direct routine and non-time-critical activities. This feature should reduce frequency congestion, avoid stuck microphones, circumvent read-back and call-back mistakes, mitigate dialect and language problems, and minimise the number of missed clearances, which are all factors in RI incidents. (It has already been mentioned in this paper that a UK version, the digital ATIS, is in operation at London Gatwick airport.)
Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS)
In spite of its regrettable acronym, the RIP system is being actively developed by NASA. It uses a head-up display to show the pilot roll out, turn-off and taxi guidance. A moving map display (head down) shows the aircraft's position, the location of other traffic in the vicinity, the appropriate ATC instructions and runway status. Alert messages are generated on board the aircraft and warning messages on the moving map display show potential traffic conflicts.
3-D Runway Surface Markings
The most frequently cited contributory factor to an RI is difficulty in interpreting or observing runway surface markings. The Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, a part of the Mitre Corporation of America, is carrying out research on the use of three-dimensional graphic techniques to make airport surface markings more conspicuous to aircraft and vehicle operators. The technique involves the creation of an illusion that a two-dimensional object has three dimensions. Issues relating to cost, durability, and continuous visibility have yet to be resolved.
Other Methods of Preventing RIs
From a limited survey carried out among flight crews of BA Citiexpress by one of the authors (Monro[2002] ), it was found that only 6% of the RIs covered by the survey had taken place in poor visibility. (In a more extensive survey of American aircrew reported on the American websitewww.airtravelabout.com -it was stated that in 89% of RIs weather was not a factor.) Most of the Citiexpress flight crews believed that better information and a better standard of runway and taxi-way lighting and signage could lead quickly to a reduction in RIs. Simply making signs bigger, painting the taxi-way designator on the actual taxi-way surface, and using zig-zag lines to designate the final approach to a runway holding point are all straightforward and inexpensive methods which would be effective and are easily implemented. At the same time, better attention to likely obscuration of signs themselves by surrounding grass and vegetation would be helpful. Different types of illuminated signs also need to be considered. Internal lighting should be used rather than the external methods and passive reflection relied upon at present. Omni-directional signs, rather than those of a flat construction, as at present, should be considered to overcome the limitations imposed by restricted viewing angles from the cockpit.
Using photo-detection systems at holding-points could provide an alarm in the tower, and ideally in the aircraft cockpit also, in the event of any unauthorised crossing of a holding-point. If there is a difficulty with installing such an alerting system in the cockpit, either because of operator resistance to increased expense, or reluctance on the part of the regulatory authority to make it mandatory, then the use of an external system of warning lighting, easily visible from the cockpit, to alert crews who have crossed the holding point should be considered. The use of a traffic light signalling arrangement, in which a green light indication would permit an aircraft to proceed on to a runway, should also be evaluated. Greater effort, too, is needed to ensure consistency in the use of the internationally agreed RT phraseology. The difficulties for non-native English speakers can be considerable if operating in both the USA and UK and Europe. Consider, for example, the confusion occasioned by the American use of "position and hold" where the UK version is "line up and wait".
Conclusions
It would be of the greatest benefit to the aviation community in the prevention of RIs if there were an agreed definition of what such an event consisted. The definition in Europe is inadequate since it does not allow the necessary classification of recorded events.
It would be best, however, if the FAA definition were universally adopted. In that case, most of the effort to prevent RIs can be directed to the small number of major international airports which have either intersecting or parallel runways, complicated airport taxi-ways, with multiple taxi-way/runway intersections, and, because of the high volume of traffic, an overwhelming need for air traf-fic to cross active runways. This type of infrastructure creates the necessary conditions for the human error which results from the confusion caused by uncertain knowledge of an aircraft's or vehicle's location, or by communication problems.
There are many expensive technological systems available, or under development, to prevent future RIs, but their very expense and complexity mean that their universal adoption is unlikely. Simpler, cheaper remedies, particularly in respect of signage and lighting, should be implemented as a matter of priority, although it must be recognised that any active system of monitoring aircraft movement over an airport surface will be intrinsically safer than a passive one.
Nor should it be forgotten that, from the data presented here, nearly one fifth of all RIs were in Category 3, i.e. they were caused by airport and airline personnel entering a runway without ATC approval. Tightened discipline and better training could reduce these deviations and thereby prevent some RIs.
